The Jay Cutler Trade Is Complete: Who Won?

It’s official; the Jay Cutler trade has been fully completed.

Don’t believe me?  The Broncos were wheeling-and-dealing on draft day.  They now have only six picks in next year’s draft; they traded away their own first round pick and their own fifth round pick.  They still have the Bears’ first round pick, but the odds are that will be no higher in the order than the Broncos’ natural pick…and quite possibly far lower.

Here are the moves the Broncos made that relate to the Cutler trade:

Drafted Robert Ayers (DE, Tennessee) with the Bears pick.  By all indications, Ayers is a strong talent, although he really did not turn it on until his senior season.  Still, he was what the Broncos wanted to play end/undertackle in their new 3-4 scheme.

Traded their own 2010 first round draft choice to Seattle for the No. 37 pick in the 2009 draft, used to select Alphonso Smith (CB, Wake Forest):  Everyone agrees with the fact that if the Broncos did not have the Bears’ first-round choice in 2010, this trade would not have happened.  So it relates to the Cutler trade.

First, as to Smith, he is a corner with great ball skills (20 collegiate INTs, a huge number) that may be best suited to zone/cover two coverage, as his reduced size means he will have to play off larger receivers.  The Broncos had a first-round grade on him, so they were willing to give up a first-round pick to get him.

The issue comes in the actual pick they traded.  When Josh McDaniels and his partner-in-crime, GM Brian Xanders, spoke with Seahawks GM Tim Ruskell, the Broncos initially offered Seattle the Bears’ first-round choice, or the lower of the two first-round picks in 2010.

The clock was ticking.

Ruskell was happy to take C Max Unger from Oregon with the No. 37 pick, so his inclination to move was not significant.  Sensing the Broncos’ strong desire to move into that slot, Ruskell demanded the Broncos’ own first-round choice. 

Denver was initially reluctant; Ruskell stood his ground.  Denver caved and gave Ruskell the pick he wanted.  This is all documented in the Denver Post, in case anyone questions this account.

As the second round went on, Seattle saw Unger still on the board.  Around this time, Chicago GM Jerry Angelo had targeted two players with the Bears’ second-round choice, the 49th pick: WR Brian Robiskie from Ohio State, or S Mike Mitchell from Ohio.  Robiskie went 39th to Cleveland, prompting Angelo and his staff to start working the phones to see what they could get in a trade for the 49th pick.

Ruskell informed the Bears they could have Seattle’s third and fourth round selections (early picks in both rounds) for the 49th pick.  Angelo apparently told Ruskell that if their guy was gone (their guy being Mike Mitchell at this point), the Bears would do the trade.

Enter the Cryptkeeper, Al Davis.  To the derision of many, the Raiders took Mitchell with the 47th pick—after Angelo had called Mitchell to tell him the Bears would take him at No. 49.  Mitchell was now gone, so the trade went through.

Seattle took Unger with the 49th pick.  By waiting 12 spots, Seattle got their guy and turned a high third and high fourth into the Broncos’ first round choice next year. 

Meanwhile, Angelo drafted two defensive linemen (pool jumper-outer and WAC Defensive Player of the Year Jarron Gilbert from San Jose St., as well as former fullback Herny Melton from Texas).  Gilbert is regarded as a steal by many draft observers—he apparently lasted until round three due to concerns about WAC competition.  We shall see.

The Broncos trade up into the end of round two to select TE Richard Quinn from North Carolina: Using their own third round pick and the Bears’ third round pick acquired in the Cutler trade, the Broncos grabbed Quinn, a primarily blocking TE.  I say this because Quinn had all of 12 career receptions in college.

The Broncos also got a very low fourth round choice in this trade, which became G Seth Olson from Iowa, but they also dealt their fifth in 2010 later in the draft, so I feel comfortable factoring that part out.

***

So the Cutler trade can (very reasonably) be viewed as:

Jay Cutler for Robert Ayers (a mid-No. 1 choice), Alphonso Smith (a No. 2 choice), Richard Quinn, and Kyle Orton—and in all likelihood moving down in the 2010 first round.

As we saw in the draft, a No. 2 this year costs, more or less, a No. 1 next year.  Viewing it in those terms, the Bears gave up a mid-No. 1, a No. 2, and a No. 3 in this year’s draft along with Orton for Cutler, a QB heading into his fourth year who has proven he can play in the league.

Please also consider that earlier in the day, the Browns effectively traded Mark Sanchez for a mid-No. 1 choice, a No. 2, and three players.  Sanchez is a highly-regarded prospect that needs seasoning and time to become a top-level NFL QB—if he does.

Perhaps the character/charisma concerns about Cutler lead to this disparity in value.  Again, we will see how it all plays out.

Considering all of that, the Bears seem to have paid less for Cutler than the Jets paid for Sanchez, taking Cutler’s production and experience into account.  The deal also makes more sense for the Browns since they are now better positioned at QB than are the Broncos, by any impartial evaluation.

***

Obtaining a young, NFL-productive QB via trade simply does not occur.  Usually, teams have to act as the Jets did; trade up to get “their guy”—but a guy who still has to prove it.  Cutler has proven it.

If you look at Cutler’s stats in his first three years vs. John Elway’s, Cutler beats Elway in any statistical category you can name: yards-per-attempt, TD and INT ratios, TD-to-INT ratio, overall TDs, overall yards, etc.

In addition, much has been made of Cutler’s records with the Broncos as a full-season starter (7-9 and 8-8).  Consider this: John Elway played with sub-par defenses in Denver during the 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994 seasons—Elway’s sixth, eighth, 10th, and 12th seasons in the league. 

The Bronco defense ranked at 20 or lower in terms of yards and points allowed in each of those seasons.  While Elway had more experience than Cutler for each of those seasons, can you guess the Broncos’ W-L records during those years?

• 1988: 8-8
• 1990: 5-11
• 1992: 8-8
• 1994: 7-9

Cutler played with even worse defenses and had similar W-L records.  I am not saying Cutler is Elway; I am saying much of the disparagement of Cutler does not look at the facts.

 

VERDICT

Winners in the Cutler trade

The Chicago Bears, solving a decades-long issue at QB with a proven starter who is NOT the reason for the Broncos’ W-L records in the past two years, and paying a reasonable price to get him.  I know that Chris Mortensen from ESPN agrees with that assessment (not the end of debate, but certainly a strong opinion from someone who talks to every GM in the league).

The Seattle Seahawks: Seattle now has two picks that should be relatively high in the 2010 first round.  This will allow them to get an elite prospect or perhaps even two.  In my opinion, they are now the kings of the 2010 draft.  They have the flexibility to make any move they want, depending upon how things go.  They are in a very enviable position.  They need to address the QB position soon, and now they can.

But why are the Seahawks winners in the Cutler trade specifically?  Because I believe the reason they now rule the 2010 draft can be summed up by the behavior of McDaniels and Xanders.  Both feel incredible pressure to avoid a disastrous season in Denver in the wake of the Cutler deal.  I believe that pressure manifested itself in their capitulation to the demands of Seattle for the Broncos’ own pick.

 

Losers in the Cutler Trade

The Denver Broncos:  Both Xanders and McDaniels, especially McDaniels, are in the spotlight.  If the brutal 2009 Denver schedule (and if you don’t think it is brutal, go look at it) causes Denver to go 5-11, and the Broncos’ own pick is in the top-10, and could have been used or leveraged to obtain an elite QB, Bronco fans will peel the paint off the walls screaming at their TVs throughout the 2009 season, and McDaniels will be a pariah.

Seattle GM Tim Ruskell clearly has his opinion about which pick was better to acquire; no doubt he factored the Broncos’ draconian 2009 schedule into his equation.

But why are the Broncos the losers in this trade?  Ayers, Smith, and Quinn could be good players, it is true.  But the Broncos have put immense pressure on this season to win now, based on the Smith trade.  In addition, the Broncos now have one of the 6-7 worst QB situations in the league, again viewed impartially.  The team has been significantly destabilized due to the desire for McDaniels to make his mark and get rid of Cutler.

Had the Broncos not done the Smith trade—or even if they had simply obtained better terms for that trade—I would not be so certain they lost in this transaction.  However, the Cutler trade led to pressure, which made them give up an elite position in the 2010 draft to becoming more or less an afterthought.  That’s why I believe they lost.

I look forward to your opinions on the subject.

 

Who Drives NFL Passing Success? The QB or the WR?

In the wake of the Chicago Bears’ landmark trade for QB Jay Cutler, many media pundits—including a number of members of the Chicago print media—have cried, “It doesn’t matter—he still has no wide receivers to throw to!”  Many Denver Bronco enthusiasts have made statements in a similar vein, amounting to, “Cutler is a crybaby and he was made by his receivers, Marshall and Royal!”

It’s the re-packaged age-old debate about the chicken or the egg—which comes first?  Do you need a strong QB to have passing success, and can that QB make the wide receivers better, or do you have to have good wide receivers regardless of the level of talent of the QB?

There’s no way to definitively answer that question—although the passing performance of the 2009 versions of the Chicago Bears and Denver Broncos will be as close to a perfect laboratory for answering this question as you will ever find.

For those impatient folks who want to get an idea of what will happen this year, looking at some history can be instructive.  Specifically, when much of the personnel remains the same, but there is a significant quarterback change, what happens to the performance of the receivers?  Do they perform the same, or are they affected?  You would (of course) expect some changes, but are they significant or minor?

Let’s look at some evidence:

In 1979, Roger Staubach retired, leaving Danny White at the helm.  Now, Danny White was no slouch—he threw for almost the same number of yards in his career as Staubach did (a bit over 20,000).  Still, Roger Staubach is an immortal, and Danny White is a historical footnote. 

Drew Pearson would probably agree—his performance deteriorated from 55 catches, 1,026 yards, and eight TDs in 1979 to 43-568-6.  Not awful numbers, of course.  Tony Hill had no drop-off from 1979-1980, but, while still in the prime of his career, he also did not put up the same types of seasons post-1980.

For a couple of clearer examples, let’s look at the Miami Dolphins—pre-Marino, during Marino, and post-Marino (Note to haters: I am not saying Cutler is Marino).

Prior to Dan Marino’s arrival, the Dolphin offense was on the decline.  Perhaps no player exemplified this more than Nat Moore, who had been a strong receiver in the late 1970s for the Dolphins, but whose performance had been in steady decline since then.  Specifically:

• 1979:  840 yards, six TDs
• 1980:  564 yards, seven TDs
• 1981:  452 yards, two TDs
• 1982:  82 yards, one TD (strike-shortened season + some injuries)

One would think that Nat was done—toast, it was over.  However, look at Moore’s stats once Marino showed up—and yes, the Dolphins started throwing it all over the field once Marino arrived, so everyone benefited, but there’s a reason for that strategic change. After all, Shula had been run-first just about his entire career until then…but in any event, Nat was apparently happy to see Dan Marino come to town:

• 1983:  558 yards, six TDs
• 1984:  573 yards, six TDs
• 1985:  701 yards, seven TDs
• 1986:  431 yards, seven TDs

Nat then retired to home and hearth.

On the flipside, we have The Curious Case of Oronde Gadsden.  There’s no need to go into his specific statistics during and post-Marino—he was a young, productive receiver when Marino played.  Once Marino retired, he dropped off the face of the earth.

On a grander scale, you can look at the offensive rankings of a variety of teams and see the difference even more clearly.  For example, when Dallas was stable at the QB position, they had offenses that were always in the top half of the league, usually in the top five, and No. 1 many times. 

Dallas had the benefit of the Meredith-Staubach-White-Aikman progression and having 40 years of solid QB play—mostly under Tom Landry, yes, but other coaches as well.  Only since Tony Romo began starting has the Cowboy offense returned to prominence (and you can look at the Quincy Carter era to see what happened to Cowboy passing and offense after Aikman’s departure, although with personnel changes, it’s not that instructive).

 

What if you have no chickens or eggs, a.k.a the History of the Chicago Bears’ Passing Game?

Beyond all of this, to get an idea of the Bear mindset behind this trade, remember that many other commentators said, “Cutler is their best quarterback since Sid Luckman.”  Well, Sid Luckman has thrown for more yards than any QB in Bears history—and he hasn’t played for 60 years. 

He threw for 14,686 yards in his career with the Bears.  To give you an idea of the organizational frustration around passing, that is the lowest total for a yardage passing leader for any NFL team in history except for the Houston Texans, who have only been in existence since 2002—and whose career passing leader, David Carr, had just a bit less with the Texans than Luckman has with the Bears—and the Ravens, who have technically not existed for much longer, either, and even Kyle Boller came close to 10,000 yards with them. 

In other words, the QB play of the Bears has, without question, been the most consistently bad of any franchise ever in the history of the NFL.  What are two No. 1 draft picks in comparison to the goal of correcting that hideousness? 

The Bears have had a QB throw for 3,000 yards only five times.  Only once in the Bears’ 89 seasons has one QB thrown in excess of 3,200 yards for the year—Erik Kramer in 1995.  That’s 200 yards a game, folks.

We know the Bears have not had good QBs on their teams for decades. We also know they have had some good receivers during that same period. 

As one of those receivers, Muhsin Muhammad, has said, “Chicago is where receivers go to die.”  Why would that be?  Because they have not had any excellence at QB, that’s why.

In my opinion, looking at historical evidence indicates to me that it’s the chicken, not the egg, that is in charge.  Without a good QB, WRs cannot succeed, and good ones become mediocre.  This is not universal, but a fair interpretation of the data.  So beware, Brandon Marshall and (especially) Eddie Royal—young receivers who rose quickly to NFL prominence—you may have a rude surprise in store.

Meanwhile, I believe that Jerry Angelo thinks the same way, and that is why he made the Cutler trade.  If Cutler can make the Bears passing game just as good as other teams, the trade has to be viewed as a success.  Even so, fellow Bear fans, let’s hope Cutler takes our eggs and makes one hell of an omelet.

I think he will.

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